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TAGS: [PREL](#) [UNSC](#) [PGOV](#) [NK](#) [RS](#)  
SUBJECT: RUSSIA SUPPORTS DRPK UNSCR TEXT, SEEKS CLARITY ON  
ENFORCEMENT ROE'S

REF: STATE 59864

Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle; reasons 1.4(b/d).

¶1. (C) Russian DFM Aleksandr Borodavkin called in Ambassador Beyrle late June 8 (Moscow time) to discuss the current draft UNSCR under consideration in New York condemning North Korea for its recent nuclear tests and missile launches. Borodavkin opened by noting that, in principle, Russia is ready to support a strong resolution. Indeed, he voiced support for the current draft text, while noting that China continues to express some concerns with certain language.

¶2. (C) However, Borodavkin continued, the possibility that force might be used (in particular, U.S. naval force) to interdict ships suspected of transporting materiel prohibited under terms of the resolution has given Moscow pause. Before Russia agrees join consensus on the present text, or one similar to it, the GOR wanted to be certain that all UNSC members, especially the P-5, understand the potential consequences of that action. Furthermore, the GOR would appreciate clarification from the U.S. on the "rules of engagement" it would apply to enforce the resolution. For example, if ships steaming for North Korea refuse to heed the call of U.S. naval vessels to divert to ports other than in North Korea for inspection, under what conditions would force would be employed? What sort of consultation with higher authorities would take place? Borodavkin explained that the GOR felt compelled to ask these questions in light of the DPRK's unpredictable behavior, threats to use force itself and references to its mutual military assistance agreements with the PRC.

¶3. (C) Borodavkin emphasized repeatedly that the Chinese, "better than the rest of us," understand the North Koreans. He noted that Russia wanted to be completely certain that the Chinese were being consulted not just on the text, but on the consequences of the resolution, especially if it should result in the use of force. He understood this to be an "abstract discussion and an abstract request," that some might think to be of a technical nature, but for Moscow it represents real concern over how the situation might evolve. Beyrle assured Borodavkin that we are consulting with the Chinese intensively, but urged him to engage with us based on Russia's view of its own interests, not possible Chinese objections. Borodavkin emphasized that Russia shares the objective of a North Korea without nuclear weapons. That said, North Korea has already twice reneged on its commitments. Ambassador Beyrle agreed, and noted that, at this point, it would be extremely difficult to rebuild trust, and thus a suggestion in the resolution that foresaw DPRK's return to the NPT was a non-starter.

¶4. (C) Finally, Borodavkin wanted to make clear that the language in the draft resolution, its possible adoption and

implementation cannot serve - and will not be acknowledged by Russia - as a precedent for Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) discussions or action. The circumstances the international community now faces with regard to North Korea are unique and of a special nature that a strong response is appropriate. Borodavkin handed over a non-paper (in Russian) concerning the resolution and Russia's request for certain assurances concerning possible use of force. We have faxed that to EUR/RUS.

15. (C) Comment: Borodavkin emphasized the desire of Moscow to cooperate to convey a strong message to North Korea concerning its recent nuclear and missile tests. Concerns that North Korea may escalate tensions, or perhaps even employ force itself, seem to be motivating Russian caution, not confrontation, on adopting the draft resolution. Borodavkin called Ambassador Beyrle mid-morning June 9 to reinforce Moscow's strong interest in receiving, ASAP, more detail on ROE's governing high-seas interdiction by U.S. vessels. Additional clarity from us on this question will likely move Russia closer to accepting the language in the existing draft SCR. End Comment.  
BEYRLE